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INTRODUCTION 
Electronic voting (or e-voting) is widely understood as the 
use of electronic means to record, process, or tally votes. 
Almost all election systems today have some electronic 
components. In general, therefore, voting systems either 
possess some electronic components or are procedurally 
dependent on electronic systems. As use of the Internet 
becomes more and more central to modern society, several 
countriesincluding the United States, Canada, India, 
and Estoniahave used Internet technologies to support 
e-voting.1 Estonia, via their Internet voting (I-Voting) V\VWHPLQZDVWKHÀUVWVWDWHWRDOORZRQOLQHYRWLQJ
nationwide. This system aimed to take advantage of WKH QXPHURXV EHQHÀWV RI RQOLQH YRWLQJ HJ LQFUHDVHGHIÀFLHQF\DQGDFFHVVLELOLW\EXWDOVRWRSURYLGHDVHFXUH
and reliable voting process and platform.
While many observers hail Estonias success in e-voting, 
their I-Voting system has also come under great scrutiny.2 
Concerns have been based on in-person election 
observations, code reviews, and adversarial testing 
on system components. As a result, some parties have 
concluded that there are multiple ways in which insider 
threats, sophisticated online criminals, or nation-state 
attackers could successfully compromise the I-Voting 
system. Clearly these are serious concerns, given the 
potential impact of system compromise on democracy and 
the rights of Estonian citizens. 
In this paper, we examine the Estonian I-Voting system 
in light of such concerns in order to understand how 
vulnerable the system may be to cyberattacks or accidental 
disruption. We review the general procedural security 
components of the system, particularly procedural 
security controls, high-level operational security aspects, 
and transparency measures. We therefore do not focus 
1   Jordi Barrat i Esteve, Ben Goldsmith, and John Turner, 
“International experience with e-voting,” International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems (2012). 
2   Barbara Simons, “Veriied Voting Blog: Report on the Estonian 
Internet Voting System,” September 2011, https://www.
veriiedvoting.org/report-on-the-estonian-internet-voting-
system-2/, accessed 1 June 2016; Sven Heiberg, Peeter Laud, 
and Jan Willemson, “The Application of I-voting for Estonian 
Parliamentary Elections of 2011,” in E-Voting and Identity, 
(September 2012) pp. 208-223. Springer Berlin Heidelberg; 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 
“Estonia Parliamentary Elections OSCE/ODIHR Election Expert 
Team Final Report,” May 2015, http://www.osce.org/odihr/
elections/estonia/160131, accessed 12 April 2016; Drew 
Springall et al., “Security analysis of the Estonian internet voting 
system,” in Proceedings of the ACM SIGSAC Conference on 
Computer and Communications Security, Arizona, USA, 3-7 
November 2014, pp. 703-715. 
ABSTRACT
The I-Voting system that was designed and implemented LQ(VWRQLDLQLVWKHÀUVW,QWHUQHWYRWLQJV\VWHPWRKDYH
been adopted anywhere in the world. Since its inception, 
it has been met with both praise and scrutiny. Concerns 
include in-person election observations, code reviews, 
and adversarial testing on system components. As a result 
of these concerns, some parties have concluded that there 
are various ways in which insider threats and sophisticated 
external attacks could compromise the systems integrity 
and thus the voting process. 
This paper examines the procedural components of the 
I-Voting system, with an emphasis on the controls related 
to procedural security mechanisms, high-level operational 
security aspects, and system transparency measures. The 
methodological approach is based on both primary and 
secondary data sources, including interviews with key 
Estonian election personnel, in order to determine the 
extent to which the present controls mitigate the security 
risks faced by the system. 
This study makes three main arguments. First, we found 
procedural controls to be fundamentally important to the 
design of the I-Voting system. While these mechanisms go 
a long way toward preventing cyberattacks, problems in 
the system still exist. For instance, some security situations 
appear to be addressed in informal ways which rely 
heavily on the knowledge, experience, and professional UHODWLRQVKLSV EHWZHHQ RIÀFLDOV 6HFRQG LQ WHUPV RI
operational controls, we were generally impressed by the 
state of the controls adopted, particularly the incident-
handling processes during elections, as well as checks and 
investigations during and after elections. Our main concern 
regarding resilience is the increasing potential for more 
highly sophisticated attacks. As time progresses, attackers 
will naturally become stronger, and systems will have to 
adapt in order to accommodate this evolution. Third, the 
systems transparency measures have had a noteworthy LPSDFW RQ EXLOGLQJ FRQÀGHQFH DQG WUXVW LQ WKH ,9RWLQJ
system, both locally and internationally. Challenges still H[LVW KRZHYHU HVSHFLDOO\ SHUWDLQLQJ WR WKH GLIÀFXOW\ LQ
running voter awareness campaigns, as well as increasing 
voter usage of transparency measures. 
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on software engineering or encryption related issues in 
the computer systems. Our scope is guided by the fact 
that the fundamental principles underpinning a secure DQG GHPRFUDWLF RQOLQH YRWLQJ V\VWHP FUHDWH FRQÁLFWLQJ
requirements.3 7KHVH FRQÁLFWV FDQQRW EH UHVROYHG E\
software engineering alone,4 hence the need for, and 
importance of, broader procedural controls. Such controls 





To what extent are the procedural controls employed in 
the Estonian I-Voting system adequate protection against 
attacks?
RQ2: 
What operational security measures are employed in the 
Estonian I-Voting system, and how resilient is this part of 
the system to attacks?
RQ3: 
How transparent are key procedures in the Estonian 
I-Voting system for the electorate and observers, and 
to what extent is such transparency able to generate FRQÀGHQFHLQWKHVHFXULW\RIWKHV\VWHP"
To address the research questions outlined above, we IROORZHG D WKUHHVWHS PHWKRGRORJ\ )LUVW ZH LGHQWLÀHG
and contextualised the security aspects of the I-Voting 
system. Second, we interviewed key personnel involved 
in various stages of the election process in order to gain 
detailed insights into the procedural security mechanisms 
and how they function. Third, we conducted a thematic 
analysis in order to determine the extent to which present 
controls mitigate the security risks facing the Estonian 
I-Voting system. Where appropriate, we also suggest 
enhancements.
 :H IRXQG WKDW (VWRQLD KDV VLJQLÀFDQW H[SHUWLVH DQG
experience in conducting successful electronic elections 
that value security and transparency. While we noted 
many positive attributes of the I-Voting system, there 
3   Dimitris A. Gritzalis, “Principles and Requirements for a Secure 
e-Voting System,” Computers and Security, Vol. 21, No. 6 
(October 2002), pp. 539-556.




are also some key areas in which opportunities for 
improvement exist. For RQ1, we found that procedural 
controls are fundamental to the system and go a long 
way in preventing attacks. Crucial procedures are 
clearly documented, but some situations appear to be 
addressed in somewhat informal ways that rely heavily RQWKHNQRZOHGJHRISDUWLFXODURIÀFLDOV*LYHQWKHFORVHSURIHVVLRQDO UHODWLRQVKLSVEHWZHHQ H[LVWLQJRIÀFLDOV DQG
their vast experience with the I-Voting system, these 
processes work well at present. But this could change 
if a few of these key individuals left their roles or were 
unexpectedly unable to participate.
In terms of the operational controls in RQ2, we were 
generally impressed by the state of the controls adopted, 
particularly the computer incident-handling processes 
during elections, as well as the analyses, checks, and 
investigations during and after elections (e.g., on 
incoming ballots, server logs, etc.). Our main concern 
regarding resilience is the increasing potential of highly 
sophisticated attacks (either via large-scale compromise 
of voter machines or attacks on hardware before reaching 
the system). As time progresses, attackers will become 
stronger and systems must be updated constantly in order 
to accommodate this concern. 
With regard to RQ3, we found that transparency measures HJ WKHXVHRIREVHUYHUVDQGWKHYRWHYHULÀFDWLRQDSSKDYH KDG D QRWHZRUWK\ LPSDFW RQ EXLOGLQJ FRQÀGHQFH
and trust in the I-Voting system. A small set of key 
challenges still exists, however, particularly pertaining to WKHGLIÀFXOWLHVLQUXQQLQJYRWHUDZDUHQHVVFDPSDLJQVDQG
in increasing voter usage of transparency measures (e.g., WKHYHULÀFDWLRQDSS$VWKHVHLVVXHVDUHNQRZQWRHOHFWLRQRIÀFLDOVDQGFRPPLWWHHVZHKRSHWRVHHPHDVXUHVWDNHQ
to improve the system in the future, which would go IXUWKHULQEXLOGLQJYRWHUFRQÀGHQFH
Finally, we must state that there is one main limitation to 
our work. This relates to the fact that our research relies 
on interview reports on voting processes and systems from 
individuals in Estonia, as opposed to direct observation of 
the I-Voting system in process. We attempted to counteract WKLVSRWHQWLDOZHDNQHVVE\HQJDJLQJLQDFULWLFDOUHÁHFWLRQ
on the documented system and existing literature, as well 
as by interviewing a range of experts from across Estonia.
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BACKGROUND: E-VOTING FOR 
NATIONAL ELECTIONS AND THE 
I-VOTING SYSTEM
Two main types of e-voting mechanisms exist: on-site 
systems and remote systems.5 On-site systems were WKH ÀUVW WR EH DGRSWHG 7KHVH UHTXLUH HOHFWURQLF SROOLQJ
stations in which voters can cast their ballots. By contrast, 
remote electronic voting or I-Voting allows users to vote 
online from their designated devices. The latter approach 
is favoured by countries and governmental authorities 
embracing e-voting for reasons of accessibility, 
participation and cost reduction.6 
Improving representative democracy and fortifying 
procedures that focus on empowering citizens are 
fundamental principles of any e-voting system. Thus, it 
is imperative to ensure equality and equity with respect 
to ease and opportunity of access, as well as transparency 
and public scrutiny for the electoral process. Major 
requirements elicited from these principles can be grouped 
into six categories: generality, freedom, equality, secrecy, 
directness, and democracy.3 Security, which ensures that 
some of these qualities are maintained, is also essential to 
the process.
Countries that have been involved in testing e-voting 
systems in electoral processes include Estonia, the 
Netherlands, Canada, and Australia. The systems used 
for elections in these countries have been analysed from 
various perspectives, ranging from how they comply ZLWK VHFXULW\ QHHGV WR KRZ WKH\ DGGUHVV YHULÀDELOLW\
and transparency requirements. As a result of these 
evaluations, some systems have been discontinued (e.g., 
in the Netherlands), while others (e.g., in Estonia) have 
stood the test of time.7
Estonia is one of the most experienced countries in the 
world in practising electronic democracy. This comes 
as little surprise, since the nation has always been at the 
forefront of adopting innovative technologies to enhance 
the lives of its citizens. The I-Voting system, which is 
intended to further enhance democratic procedures and 
5   Peter Haynes and Jason Healey, “Online Voting, Rewards 
and Risks,” 2014, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/
publications/Online_Voting_Rewards_and_Risks.pdf, accessed 11 
April 2016.
6   Jordi Barrat i Esteve, Ben Goldsmith, and John Turner, 
“International Experience with e-Voting,” International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems (2012).
7   J. Paul Gibson, Robert Krimmer, Vanessa Teague, and Julia Pomares. 
“A Review of E-Voting: The Past, Present and Future.” Annals of 
Telecommunications, Vol. 71, No. 7 (2016); pp. 279-286.
increase the turnout in electoral processes, is one of 
Estonias many technical achievements. 
The I-Voting system has four main components: 
the I-Voting Client Application (IVCA), the Vote 
Forwarding Server (VFS), the Vote Storage Server 
(VSS) and the Vote Counting Application (VCA).8 The 
IVCA is used by the voters to cast their votes, typically 
through a personal computing device. The VFS is the 
only public-facing server of the system; it is responsible 
for authenticating voters and forwarding the votes to the 
VSS. The VSS stores all votes which have been cast, 
including repeated ones. After the close of advance 
polls, it checks and removes the cancelled votes, and 
separates the outer encryption envelopes (which hold the 
voter identity) from inner envelopes (which contain the YRWHFDVW)LQDOO\ WKH9&$DQRIÁLQHDQGDLUJDSSHG
server, is loaded with the valid votes. These votes are 
decrypted with the private key possessed by members of 
the National Election Committee (NEC), and the VCA 
then tabulates the votes and outputs the results of the 
I-Voting process.
Security has been a core consideration in the I-Voting 
system since its inception in 2005. In 2010, the Estonian 
National Electoral Committee (NEC) produced a 
security analysis and measures report.9 This report 
provides detailed security measures on how to ensure 
that the architectural components of the system will not 
be compromised; information on the audit, monitoring, 
incident handling and recovery practices; and 
operational measures (such as the division of tasks and 
formal procedures on managing risks), complementing 
technical requirements to ensure that a breach of policies 
is deterred. The report concludes with the opinion that 
the security of the I-Voting system exceeds the security 
of conventional voting with ballot papers. 
Regardless of its apparent success in implementation 
and achieving increased electoral participation,10 some 
observers have raised concerns about procedural and 
technical predicaments. These include the possibility of 
infecting the PC of a voter and changing their vote, and the ODFNRIHQGWRHQGYHULÀFDWLRQDQGIRUHQVLFDXGLWWULDOVRI
8   NEC, “Internet Voting in Estonia.”
9   Arne Ansper et al., “E-voting Concept Security: Analysis and 
Measures,” Estonian National Electoral Committee. 2010. EH-
02-02.
10   Estonian National Electoral Committee (NEC), “Statistics about 
Internet Voting in Estonia,” 2015, http://www.vvk.ee/voting-
methods-in-estonia/engindex/statistics, accessed 12 May 2016.
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the system.11 In a similar vein, Marco Prandini and Marco 
Ramilli conclude that no e-voting system is ready to be 
implemented on a large scale yet, and that the adoption 
of such a system remains affected by fundamental issues, 
such as trust, that technology cannot completely address.12 
They further highlight the costs of implementing the ,9RWLQJV\VWHP³JRRG,QWHUQHWDFFHVVDQGRIÁLQHVXSSRUW
for the system.
As the I-Voting system has evolved, Estonia has made VHYHUDO PRGLÀFDWLRQV WR WKH V\VWHP ZLWK DGGLWLRQDO
procedural controls being implemented. For instance, 
a novel method to verify that a vote has been cast as 
intended and recorded as cast has now been provided.13 
In addition, in-depth monitoring of the voting system 
has been established to detect server attacks and system 
malfunctions, as well as studying voter behaviour.14 
Large parts of the source code underpinning the system 
and documentation regarding the procedural details have 
also been made publicly available.15 These actions seek 
not only to bolster security of the system and enforce key 
requirements,16 EXW DOVR WREXLOG WUXVW DQGFRQÀGHQFH LQ
the system from both voters and independent assessors. 
Despite these enhancements, recent studies suggest 
that problems still exist. Some articles have sought to 
demonstrate these issues using simulated examples of 
attack-payloads and patterns to compromise the electoral 
process.10 Others point to the fact that the reliance on 
a complicated set of procedures rather than technical 
means to achieve integrity may not be ideal.17 Further FRQFHUQVKDYHDOVREHHQLGHQWLÀHGLQWKHRSHUDWLRQDODQG
11   Drew Springall et al., “Security Analysis of the Estonian Internet 
Voting System,” in Proceedings of the ACM SIGSAC Conference 
on Computer and Communications Security, Arizona, USA, 3-7 
November 2014, pp. 703-715.
12   Marco Prandini and Marco Ramilli, “Internet Voting: Fatally 
Torn between Conlicting Goals?,” in Proceedings of the 6th 
International Conference on Theory and Practice of Electronic 
Governance, NY, USA, October 22-25, 2012, pp. 58-61.
13   Sven Heiberg, and Jan Willemson, “Veriiable Internet Voting in 
Estonia,” in Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on 
Electronic Voting: Verifying the Vote (EVOTE), Lochau, Austria, 
29–31 October 2014, pp. 1-8.
14   Sven Heiberg, Arnis Parsovs, and Jan Willemson, “Log Analysis of 
Estonian Internet Voting 2013–2014,” E-Voting and Identity, 
2015, pp. 19-34.
15   Estonian National Electoral Committee (NEC), “E-Voting System: 
A General Overview,” 2010, http://www.vvk.ee/public/dok/
General_Description_E-Voting_2010.pdf, accessed 12 February 
2016.
16   Gritzalis, “Principles and Requirements for a Security  
e-Voting System.”
17   J. Alex Halderman, “Practical Attacks on Real-World E-Voting in 
Real-World Electronic Voting: Design, Analysis and Deployment”, 
in Feng Hao and Peter Y.A. Ryan, eds., Real-World Electronic 
Voting: Design, Analysis and Deployment (Oxford: Taylor and 
Francis, 2016).
transparency measures proposed in the system. As a result RI WKHVH RQJRLQJ FRQFHUQV ZH H[DPLQH DQG UHÁHFW RQWKHVHVSHFLÀFIHDWXUHVRIWKH,9RWLQJV\VWHPSURFHGXUDO
security, operational security, and transparency measures. 
ASSESSMENT OF THE  
I-VOTING SYSTEM 
OVERVIEW
In this section, we assess the procedural security controls, 
operational security measures and transparency measures 
of the I-Voting system, as well as the extent to which 
they mitigate security and trust risks. First, we analysed 
the literature pertaining to these three main components, 
and then developed a set of interview questions to explore 
those areas in more detail. These queries focused on 
reported voting concerns, outstanding security challenges, 
and general system functionality. 
Second, we recruited seven individuals with detailed 
knowledge of, and insight into, the I-Voting system 
(including its administration, process aspects, and security 
functions). The majority of the participants had at least 
twelve years of experience with Internet voting and 
elections in general. Moreover, in order to encourage 
honest and open responses, we opted for anonymous UHSRUWLQJ RI LQWHUYLHZ FRPPHQWDULHV DQG ÀQGLQJV :H
analysed the resulting data using content analysis, as 
well as a mixture of deductive and inductive reasoning.18 ,Q WKLVZD\ZH LGHQWLÀHGVHYHUDOFRUH UHVSRQVH WKHPHV
which we discuss below. 
PROCEDURAL CONTROLS
Procedural security controls are a core component of the ,9RWLQJV\VWHP7KHVHFRQWUROVGHÀQH WKHPDLQPDQXDODFWLYLWLHV DQG SUDFWLFHV WKDW HOHFWLRQ RIÀFLDOV HQJDJH LQ
to protect the voting system. Throughout the course of 
the interviews, procedural controls were discussed in 
a variety of contexts. Two main areas were highlighted 
by our thematic analysis: the importance of procedural 
controls and knowledge transfer.
5HÁHFWLQJRQWKHLPSRUWDQFHRISURFHGXUHV
Procedural controls were referred to both directly and 
indirectly by several interviewees. The primary report 
documenting these controls is the election manual. Among 
18   Bruce L. Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social 
Sciences (Oxford: Pearson, 2004).
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other things, its aims are to ensure: (a) that data integrity EHWZHHQ RQOLQH DQG RIÁLQH V\VWHPV LV PDLQWDLQHG E
that access control is regulated; and (c) that there are 
mechanisms for dispute resolution and system continuity. 
Most interviewees felt that the procedural controls 
mentioned in the election manual were very important. 
Server operations were deemed particularly crucial to 
protect. One interviewee even stated that procedural 
controls are relied upon because of the trust required to 
operate under the assumption that the key to the server was 
not somehow leaked or that the privacy of the system is 
not interrupted.19 Moreover, because of the architectural 
design and technical setup of the I-Voting system, Estonia 
relies quite heavily on such procedures. 
Another example can be found in the context of 
maintaining data integrity. There is a procedure to ensure 
that two individuals serve as auditors who observe key 
processes, such as when the server key is being generated, 
or when election data is transferred from the online server WRWKHRIÁLQHVHUYHU7KHDXGLWRUVXVHWKHHOHFWLRQPDQXDO
to ensure that all tasks relating to the secure treatment 
of keys are being followed. As one interviewee stated, 
you had to trustthat this private key of the server is 
not somehow leakedand making sure that this doesnt 
happen actually relies quite heavily on organisational 
measures.20 These processes are regarded as valuable 
in reducing the potential for malicious attacks or human 
error.
Taking procedural mechanisms for secure server access 
during elections as another example, interviewees PHQWLRQHG WKDW ´WKHUH DUH YHU\ VSHFLÀF SHRSOH ZKR FDQ
go there.21 This indicates that only those with proper 
authority can enter the server room. This was a positive DQGQRWHZRUWK\ÀQGLQJ:HZHUHXQDEOHWRYHULI\ZKHWKHUDQ\RWKHUFKHFNVZHUHFRQGXFWHGWRHQVXUHWKDWRIÀFLDOV
were not able to bring potentially malicious devices (e.g., 
infected pen drives) into the room, however. While attacks 
using such devices (whether purposeful or inadvertent) 
may be unlikely given the relationships and professional 
trust described by interviewees, the risk should be 
considered and dealt with appropriately.
Finally, to comment on dispute resolution procedures, we 
were pleased to see that there are very clear mechanisms 
for contesting the validity of a vote or making a complaint. 
According to one interviewee, in order to reach a speedy 
dispute resolution, the legal time frames are as follows: 
19  Author interview.
20  Author interview.
21  Author interview.
WKUHH GD\V WR ÀOH D FRPSODLQW ÀYH GD\V WR UHVROYH WKH
issue, and another three days to contest the decision in 
the Supreme Court. These procedures have helped to 
minimise the risk posed by unregulated actions, and have 
provided a formal mechanism for resolving disputes. It FDQKRZHYHUEHGLIÀFXOWWRVXEPLWVXFKDFRPSODLQWDV
the person submitting needs to have knowledge of the 
law relevant to the complaint. While increased awareness 
and education may help address this issue, the Electronic 
Voting Committee also has instituted an informal notice 
procedure that would enable a complaint to be submitted ZLWKRXWNQRZOHGJHRIWKHOHJDOFRQWH[W7KLVLVGHÀQLWHO\
a positive and welcome measure.
3URFHGXUDOFRQWUROVDQGNQRZOHGJHWUDQVIHU
While procedural controls improve security, we had 
concerns about the sustainability of existing security 
procedures, particularly with reference to knowledge GHÀQLWLRQ DQG WUDQVIHU )RU H[DPSOH ZKHQ DVNHG DERXW
incorporating lessons learned from dispute measures in 
particular, an interviewee said: if youre asking if we 
have some sort of formalised process for that, then no.22 
Our interactions with interviewees made it clear that such 
information is generally incorporated, but that there appear 
to be few formal mechanisms to guide or ensure that 
incorporation. This may work well for a close-knit society 
such as that of Estonia. A lack of procedural formality 
does, however, risk some aspects being inadvertently 
overlooked or forgotten.
6WDIÀQJLVDQRWKHUSRLQWZRUWKFRQVLGHULQJLQWKLVJHQHUDOFRQWH[W*LYHQWKDWPRVWRIWKHHOHFWRUDOVWDIIKDVUHPDLQHG
the same over time, in our interviews we noticed a general 
feeling that everyone already knows what to do; indeed, one 
interviewee stated, they already know what to do, so we 
dont go into detail over it,23 referring to some aspects of 
the system or processes. While it is advantageous to have a 
core set of professionals to rely upon, from our perspective, 
the extent to which there are formalised procedures for 
staff training and planning for future knowledge sharing 
was unclear. This could be very important for knowledge 
transfer, especially if in future vote collection is outsourced, 
as one interviewee suggested. While this could help build 
a thriving market around I-Voting consulting, there would 
need to be a programme for knowledge transfer in order to 
maintain adequate levels of security. Moving forward, it 
will be interesting to track the usage of procedural controls 
as the system evolves.
22  Author interview.
23  Author interview.
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OPERATIONAL CONTROLS
The fundamental principles underpinning a secure DQG GHPRFUDWLF ,9RWLQJ V\VWHP FUHDWH FRQÁLFWLQJ
requirements.247KHVHFRQÁLFWVDUHGHHPHGLPSRVVLEOHWR
resolve by software engineering,25 rendering the design 
and implementation of operational security controls the 
cornerstone of a successful system. Regarding I-Voting, 
we concentrate on three operational security control 
concerns: incident handling during the electoral period, 
voter context and risks, and devices and equipment used 
in the electoral process.
,QFLGHQWKDQGOLQJGXULQJWKHHOHFWRUDOSHULRG
The Incident Report Centre is a core component of the 
Estonian voting system. This centre has two purposes: to 
address technical glitches reported to the client support 
centre and to actively scan for anomalous behaviours 
in the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) HQYLURQPHQW*LYHQ WKHSRWHQWLDO WKUHDW IURPVLJQLÀFDQW
actors, it is evident that Estonia relies on an effective 
CERT in order to actively monitor potential attacks on the 
voting platform. From our interviews, we found it more 
than encouraging to hear that once anomalies are spotted, WKHUH DUH VSHFLÀF SURFHVVHV LQ SODFH WR DSSURSULDWHO\
address the issues, which may even result in technicians 
being dispatched to an area of concern.
For instance, interviewees mentioned a case in which a 
team was dispatched to a house suspected of spreading 
malware targeting voting applications (which turned out 
to be that of an elderly lady who had voted more than 500 
times, assuming each vote would be counted separately). 
But this case clearly demonstrates the capability of the 
incident response team to be deployed rapidly. Once LQFLGHQWVDUH LGHQWLÀHG WKH\DUH UHSRUWHGEDVHGRQ WKHLU
severity to the NEC. The NEC may then decide to take 
further action, which could, under extreme circumstances, 
lead to turning off the I-Voting system for a particular 
election and request that citizens cast their votes by 
traditional means. This control would be somewhat 
aggressive, but would ensure that people who are facing 
problems voting electronically would still be able to 
participate in a given election.
24   Gritzalis, “Principles and Requirements for a Security e-Voting 
System.”
25   NEC, “Internet Voting in Estonia.”
9RWHUFRQWH[WDQGULVNV
The human voter has previously been recognised as the 
most vulnerable link in the I-Voting system.26 Our analysis 
concurs with this observation. Interviewees agreed that 
[they] have introduced e-voting by accepting the risk that 
the voter is the weakest link, so we cannot deny that many 
things can happen in the voters computer.27 Therefore, 
they acknowledge that there is little potential for them to 
control the voter environment, though the system still 
depend[s] on [it] being virus free.28 
 
To avoid potentially malicious code being spread by 
users devices or malicious attempts to control the voting 
system, input from public interfaces is thoroughly checked 
to ensure that the elements of the digital signature are 
there, that the zip container is well formed.29 Moreover, 
the decrypted ballot is checked for compliance against UXOHVWKDWKDYHEHHQVHWWRGHÀQHYDOLGEDOORWV7KHVHDUH
commendable practices, as it is of crucial importance that 
irregular votes are removed before reaching the main 
system. In the past, technically skilled voters have actually HQJLQHHUHG WKHRIÀFLDO DSSOLFDWLRQFRGH´>WR@ FKDQJH WKH>FDQGLGDWH@QXPEHUWRUHÁHFWDQRQH[LVWHQWFDQGLGDWHRU
to write some completely garbled code and then they have 
encrypted this.30 Thus, such checks on incoming votes are 
helpful at blocking any malware injection attempts, if such 
an attack occurs. 
Although a fundamental risk emanates from the voters 
devices, a large-scale attack affecting voters machines 
is considered highly unlikely by the NEC.31 The risk that 
is involved is acceptable because of the perceived low OLNHOLKRRG RI XQGHWHFWHG PDOZDUH DIIHFWLQJ D VLJQLÀFDQW
proportion of votes. We believe the possibilities of a large-
scale attack to be higher, especially since there have been 
situations where citizens used unlicensed versions of the 
Windows operating system. The number of complaints 
from voters regarding that operating system were so VLJQLÀFDQWWKDWWKH\IRUFHGWKHHYRWLQJFRPPLWWHHWRDGDSWWKHYHULÀFDWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWVRIYRWHU·VVRIWZDUHLQRUGHUWR
allow them to vote. An interviewee recounted that people ZKR GLG QRW KDYH RIÀFLDO«:LQGRZV ;3 ZHUH QRW DEOH
to build up a secure channel between the application and 
the server. So some layers of security had to be changed 
26   Estonian National Electoral Committee (NEC), “E-Voting System: A 
General Overview,” 2010. http://www.vvk.ee/public/dok/General_
Description_E-Voting_2010.pdf, accessed 12 February 2016.
27  Author interview.
28  Author interview.
29  Author interview.
30  Author interview.
31   Arne Ansper et al., “E-voting Concept Security: Analysis and 
Measures,” Estonian National Electoral Committee. 2010. EH-02-02.
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RQWKHÀUVWGD\«:HGLGQ·WH[SHFWWKDWVRPDQ\SHRSOH
would have [problems].32 Therefore, one can imagine an 
attacker exploiting this vulnerability by inserting a virus 
into a pirated version of Windows and promoting this 
to Estonian citizens via torrent applications (i.e., where 
people can download a variety of digital materials). 
There are some notices, within the voter application and 
online, that advise voters to install anti-virus systems. We 
believe that this information should also focus on larger 
issues, such as educating users about not obtaining illegal RUXQVXSSRUWHGVRIWZDUH7KH:LQGRZV;3FDVHDOEHLWD
serious breach of security, is unlikely to occur in the future 
because most operating systems now allow users to upgrade WR QHZ YHUVLRQV IRU IUHH ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH YHULÀFDWLRQ RI
votes procedure, when fully used by the voters, enables 
them to detect that their vote has been manipulated. 
'HYLFHVDQGHTXLSPHQWXVHGLQWKH HOHFWRUDOSURFHVV
The hardware used during elections is another potential 
source of attacks. There are strict procedures to verify that 
the hardware is malware-free, since it may be delivered WRXVGHOLEHUDWHO\PRGLÀHGWRIDOVLI\RXUHOHFWLRQVµ33 We EHOLHYHWKDWH[LVWLQJFKHFNVDSSHDUVXIÀFLHQWEXWWKDWWKHUHVKRXOGEHDGGLWLRQDOFKHFNVIRUÀUPZDUHPDOZDUHLQRUGHU
to eliminate the possibility of a sophisticated attack. It is 
possible that the concept of Advanced Persistent Threats, 
i.e., slow-moving and deliberate attacks applied to quietly 
compromise information systems without revealing 
themselves,34 may also be relevant here. We highlight this 
because there are increasing concerns about the ability of H[WHUQDOSDUWLHVWRLQÁXHQFHDFRXQWU\·VHOHFWLRQV35
In order to avoid physical attacks on the system (i.e., 
servers), and to generally maintain system resilience, there 
are also several security requirements in place regarding 
the facilities. For instance, one interviewee stated that 
there are strict security measures of what this room 
must [have] when selecting facilities to host systems.36 
The server room is deemed of critical importance, and 
access to the room is controlled. Every possible input 
32  Author interview.
33  Author interview.
34   Ivo Friedberg, Florian Skopik, Giuseppe Settanni, and Roman 
Fiedler, “Combating Advanced Persistent Threats: From Network 
Event Correlation to Incident Detection,” Computers and Security 
Vol. 48 (Oct 2015) pp. 35-57.
35   Bruce Schneier, “By November, Russian Hackers Could Target 
Voting Machines,” The Washington Post, 27 July 2016, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/07/27/by-
november-russian-hackers-could-target-voting-machines/?utm_
term=.d4779b79e22b , accessed 1 August 2016.
36  Author interview.
port to the server is covered with red tape and regularly 
checked for tampering. Here, the conundrum of balancing 
transparency (in terms of allowing people to witness from 
close proximity the electoral process) and security is more 
evident than ever, highlighting the importance of the red-WDSHRSHUDWLRQDOFRQWUROWRDOOHYLDWHWKHFRQÁLFW
Finally, in order to maintain anonymity in the voting SURFHVV RQFH WKH YRWHV DUH VWULSSHG RI WKH ÀUVW OHYHO RI
encryption, these are transferred to the Vote Counting 
Application for the counting process. Standard procedures 
require the use of DVDs for transferring the data, but there 
have been occurrences in which glitches in the system KDYH OHG WR RIÀFLDOV XVLQJ UHPRYDEOH GHYLFHV LQVWHDG
Though a serious violation of the operational security FRQWUROV DV GHÀQHG E\ H[LVWLQJ (VWRQLDQ SURFHGXUHV DOO
the components are backed up and every action is logged 
to reduce undetected attempts at vote manipulation; 
monitoring practices would also enable the detection 
of malware. We must emphasise, however, that better 
procedures are needed to handle such issues in the future. 
These procedures should be designed with consideration 
of observers and the perceptions they will have if there are 
variations from documented protocol.
TRANSPARENCY MEASURES
Transparency measures seek to provide insight into the 
I-Voting system and the way it functions, with the aim RI EXLOGLQJ SXEOLF WUXVW DQG FRQÀGHQFH 2XU DQDO\VLV RI
these measures explores three key areas: the auditing, 
observation, and monitoring of the election process; public 
awareness of e-voting and secure practices; and vote YHULÀFDWLRQ
$XGLWLQJREVHUYDWLRQDQGPRQLWRULQJRIWKH HOHFWLRQSURFHVV
The monitoring of the I-Voting process by auditors was 
one of the main transparency measures mentioned by 
interviewees. Several independent auditors are employed 
during an election period; they provide feedback on the 
extent to which critical processes are followed. After HOHFWLRQV DXGLWRUV LVVXH D UHSRUW ZLWK WKHLU ÀQGLQJV
The use of auditors not only enhances transparency, but 
also provides an opportunity for the election committee WR FRQVLGHU DQG UHÁHFW RQ WKH OHVVRQV OHDUQHG RQFH WKH
election period is over. 
In addition to auditors, public observers are allowed 
to witness the election process. A press release before 
the elections addresses the public and all parties to the 
election, providing them with the opportunity of observing 
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the I-Voting process. Anyone can serve as an observer; no 
vetting is necessary, and the process is such that they can 
view elections in real time and provide suggestions and 
feedback. From our perspective, and considering earlier ÀQGLQJVUHJDUGLQJSURFHGXUDOFRQWUROVZHZHUHHVSHFLDOO\
interested in how such feedback was utilised by election RIÀFLDOV:HZHUHSOHDVHGWRGLVFRYHUWKHXVHRIDPHWKRGZKLFKDFFRPPRGDWHVDQGUHÁHFWVRQ WKLV IHHGEDFNERWK
during and after elections. As one interviewee mentioned, 
the suggestions provided by observers have already been 
implemented quite a lot.37 Though we were unable to 
explore this matter further due to time constraints of the 
study, it is an unequivocally positive sign of transparency 
and democracy.
One challenge we noted, which was also expressed 
by interviewees, was that observers often do not fully 
understand the voting system. The electoral committee 
is obliged to offer a two-day course on the technical 
details for observers, but attendance is low. Moreover, 
the majority of attendees do not complete the course due 
to an overload of information. There is an interesting 
conundrum to be addressed, since the manner in which the 
committee can engage with the public to communicate the 
I-Voting systems details is rather restricted. As pointed out 
by interviewees, questions regarding misleading the public PD\EH UDLVHG LI WKH WHFKQRORJLFDOGHWDLOV DUH VLPSOLÀHG
An outstanding challenge, therefore, is to balance the level 
of voter interest with the amount of information provided. 
This is especially important because some voters may not 
be interested in highly technical aspects, but still desire 
some engagement to understand how the system works 
and maintains standard voting requirements (as in the DUWLFOHE\'LPLWULV*ULW]DOLV38 
Publication of the I-Voting systems documentation is 
one of the most crucial transparency measures.14 These 
documents cover topics from preparing the system to FRQGXFWLQJ HYRWLQJ DQG ÀQDO RSHUDWLRQDO SURFHGXUHV7KH ÀOPLQJ RI FULWLFDO SURFHVVHV HJ VHUYHU VRIWZDUH
installation) is also conducted for purposes of transparency. 
As one interviewee points out with respect to the server GHWDLOV´ WKHVFUHHQRIDFRPSXWHULVÀOPHG«DQGSHUFHQW
of the code used is also made public.39 After the elections, 
some of these videos have also been released on YouTube 
for public consumption. We view the publication of these 
documents, code (particularly for community review), and 
videos as encouraging transparency measures. 
With regard to the 3 percent of the code not published, we 
37  Author interview.
38   Gritzalis, “Principles and Requirements for a Security e-Voting 
System.”
39  Author interview.
discovered that this code is focused on malware detection 
and avoidance at the voters machine, and that publishing 
it would therefore effectively defeat its purpose. Two 
transparency options for this issue have been made available. 
First the code is checked and audited by independent and 
trusted third parties; second, the voting protocol is fully 
documented online, and hence any individual (given the 
appropriate skills) could create his or her own compliant YRWLQJ VRIWZDUH 7KHVH HIIRUWV E\ HOHFWLRQ RIÀFLDOV DUH
noteworthy and demonstrate some real impetus toward 
operating a transparent system.
(YRWLQJVHFXULW\DQGDZDUHQHVV
Awareness is another important factor in supporting 
transparency. At its initial launch, the I-Voting system was 
heavily promoted to enable the public to understand the 
voting process and the key aspects of security. As mentioned DERYH WKHUH LV DOVR D VLJQLÀFDQW DPRXQW RI GHWDLO RQ WKH
system online (e.g., the NEC).40 In this way, a platform of 
trust could be built based on information and understanding. 0RUH UHFHQWO\ZKHQ WKHYRWHYHULÀFDWLRQDSSOLFDWLRQZDV
released, there were media campaigns and newspaper 
articles explaining to the public how to engage with the new 
technology. 
We noticed, however, that there does not appear to be a 
comprehensive, ongoing (at least leading up to and during HOHFWLRQV RIÀFLDO FDPSDLJQ WR SURPRWH VHFXUH HYRWLQJ
This campaign would inform the public of best practices for 
secure electronic voting, such as having updated malware 
and antivirus software installed, as well as being aware of 
the range of risks and how to mitigate them. We note the 
formal acceptance of the risk of voter PCs,41 but still felt that 
more could be attempted in this area. When we mentioned 
this to interviewees, they stressed that such campaigns 
had been run in the past and were being considered for the 
future, but that there were political challenges with bespoke 
e-voting campaigns, namely that such efforts were seen by 
some parties to provide more attention to one form of voting RYHUDQRWKHU7KLVLVDGLIÀFXOWSUHGLFDPHQWEXWWKHUHDUH
two potential solutions: running smaller, security-focused 
campaigns for all voting methods; or incorporating such 
information into e-governance campaigns more broadly.
40   Arne Ansper et al., “E-Voting Concept Security: Analysis and 
Measures,” Estonian National Electoral Committee. 2010. EH-02-
02; and Estonian National Electoral Committee (NEC), “E-Voting 
System: A General Overview,” 2010, http://www.vvk.ee/public/
dok/General_Description_E-Voting_2010.pdf, accessed 12 
February 2016.
41   Arne Ansper et al., “E-Voting Concept Security: Analysis and 
Measures,” Estonian National Electoral Committee. 2010. EH-
02-02.
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The next municipal elections (scheduled for 2017) might be 
an ideal opportunity to explore the suggestions mentioned 
above. This is because Estonia plans to lower the voting 
age to 16- and 17-year-olds (for local elections only). This 
new development will create 25,000 new voters, and it 
is expected that a special campaign will be run for them. 
Having online safety as part of the school curriculum would 
also build awareness and provide a better understanding of KRZ ,9RWLQJ SURFHGXUHV DUH HVWDEOLVKHG WKXV EHQHÀWLQJ
e-voting transparency. We have already witnessed some 
awareness efforts in Estonia but they are promoted via 
other means.42
9HULÀFDWLRQ
Allowing users to verify their votes via a smartphone 
application is another mechanism for enhancing WUDQVSDUHQF\ 3URFHGXUDOO\ WKH YHULÀFDWLRQ DSSOLFDWLRQ
performs as expected and is simple to use. According to RQH LQWHUYLHZHH ´WKH YHULÀFDWLRQ DSSOLFDWLRQ DOORZV IRU
actual proof of the process and enhances trust.43 This 
has also been witnessed through a system study in which RIÀFLDOVIRXQGWKDWZKLOHRQO\DURXQGSHUFHQWRIYRWHUVYHULÀHG WKHLU YRWHV WKH DYDLODELOLW\ RI WKH DSSOLFDWLRQLQFUHDVHG FRQÀGHQFH LQ WKH V\VWHP JHQHUDOO\ )URP RXU
perspective it was ideal to see the separation in devices 
used for casting and verifying votes. This meant that 
successful vote hijacking, particularly on a large scale, ZRXOGEHPRUHGLIÀFXOWDVDPDOLFLRXVSDUW\ZRXOGQHHG
to take control of both a PC and a smartphone. We do 
stress, however, that the application will only be truly 
helpful to the I-Voting process (and security concerns) if it 
is more widely used. We note that there are approaches in (VWRQLDWRZDUGWKLVJRDOHJWKHYHULÀFDWLRQDSSOLFDWLRQ
is available on Android, iOS and Windows platforms). 
Future efforts should continue to encourage their adoption 
and usage.
THE NEW I-VOTING SYSTEM
With the core topic areas of this report now examined, ZH EULHÁ\ H[SDQG XSRQ RXU LQLWLDO ÀQGLQJV WR GLVFXVV
the new version of the I-Voting system. While we were 
aware that there would be a new system iteration before 
our study commenced, it was only during the interview 
process that we recognised how different it would be. This 
future system is the result of over ten years experience 
of e-democracyfrom laws and regulations to technical 
and socio-technical aspects. This was a point highlighted 
42   UNITE-IT, “Get Online Week 2016,” 2016, http://www.unite-it.
eu/proiles/blogs/get-online-week-2016-in-estonia-raising-
awareness-and-contest?xg_source=activity, accessed 27 May 2016.
43  Author interview.
by interviewees: the system was not being overhauled due 
to concerns about the integrity of the previous system, 
but rather because it was felt to be the appropriate time 
to update the full system, including enriching server-side 
code (as opposed to simply improving it, as had been done 
for many years).  
 2QHRIWKHPRVWVLJQLÀFDQWFKDQJHVLQWKHQHZV\VWHPLV
its structure, with a focus on returning power to the NEC. ,Q OLQHZLWK WKLVJRDO WKHUH DUH D IHZNH\PRGLÀFDWLRQVZRUWK QRWLQJ )LUVW DV ZH EULHÁ\ PHQWLRQHG HDUOLHU WKH
vote collection system (i.e., the system that interacts with 
voters directly) will be outsourced to a third party, to be FKRVHQWKURXJKDWHQGHU7KHEHQHÀWKHUHLVWKDWLQRUGHUWR
run an election, the NEC only needs to provide directives, 
the list of candidates, the cryptography to be used, and the 
key and e-signature methods. Second, given this shift in 
power, the Internet voting committee is to be dissolved. 
To accommodate for the technical understanding required WR IXOÀO WKH QHZ FKDUWHU RI WKH 1(& DQ ,7 DXGLWRU ZLOO
assume a role in the NEC. 
To comment on these changes more generally, we view the 
decision to return the power to the NEC as a commendable 
move for democracy. This is especially true because a 
technically experienced individual will now be a core part 
of the election oversight and process. The only concern 
that may arise with this approach relates to the selection 
of companies to implement the vote collection system, 
and the level of checks on code and processes conducted. 
Independent assessments must continue to ensure that 
democracy is not placed at risk.
Our interviews suggested that, as the future voting system 
shifts from procedures to technology and mathematics, 
monitoring may be reduced and only processes related 
to encryption of results will be subject to observation. 
By reducing the amount of monitoring, public trust in 
the system may be affected. One interviewee noted that 
this shift represents trust in mathematics rather than 
people.44:HDJUHH WKDW WKHPRYH WRD IRUPDOO\YHULÀHG
and technically proven system is ideal in many ways. The GLIÀFXOW\ZLOOFRPHLQFRPPXQLFDWLQJWKHVHGHWDLOVWRWKH
general public, when current engagement in courses on the 
system is low. The very nature of voting and its link to 
democratic rights means that an attempt must be made for 
more accessible outlets for information about the national 
e-voting system. 
44  Author interview.
11
An Independent Assessment of the Procedural 
Components of the Estonian Internet Voting System
Working Paper Series – No. 6
$UHODWHGSRLQWWRRXUUHÁHFWLRQDERYHLVWKHHPSKDVLVRQWKHQHZV\VWHPDOORZLQJIRUYHULÀDELOLW\7KLVDOVRPDNHV
server-side operations more mathematically transparent 
and comprehensive in order to verify elections. This 
is clearly important, as any changes in votes (such as GHOHWLRQVRUPRGLÀFDWLRQVZLOOEHPRUHHDVLO\GHWHFWHG,WLVSUHPDWXUHWRUHSRUWRQWKHVSHFLÀFVRIWKHQHZV\VWHPEXW
one interviewee stated that the tender description suggests 
that it will include mix-nets, homomorphic encryption and 
provable decryption, and that the existing double envelop 
method will remain;45 the server code will also be openly SXEOLVKHGLQLWVPDMRULW\7KHVHPRGLÀFDWLRQVZLOOHQDEOHRIÀFLDOV WR SURYH WKDW WKH GHFU\SWLRQ DQG WDEXODWLRQ RI
votes is performed correctly, and will give additional 
assurance to external parties who may wish to verify the 
election results. 
Finally, in this new system there will be a more substantial 
reliance on voter and client support as a key service in the 
election process. If voters notice that the system is not 
performing as expected, they will need various options 
for client support. In the current system, there are several 
excellent support options; we hope that this continues in 
the future. Moreover, as an interviewee pointed out, the 
new system could also be used outside Estonia in the 
future46 (i.e., adapting the system to other countries), 
as there is the possibility of removing its linkages to the 
Estonian ID card. This highlights broader applicability, 
though time will tell whether such a system would arouse 
interest outside of the Estonian context. 
CONCLUSION: STATE OF SECURITY 
OF THE I-VOTING SYSTEM
Estonia has been pioneering the adoption of an I-Voting 
system as an alternative to traditional voting. With the 
experience of successfully conducting electronic elections 
for the last eleven years and gaining the trust of more 
than 30 percent of Estonian citizens,47 it is evident that 
the I-Voting system has by far surpassed other systems 
in terms of success. Electronic voting presents a huge 
challenge because many principal requirements are FRQÁLFWLQJLQQDWXUHZKLFKPHDQVWKDWGHVLJQLQJHIIHFWLYH
operational and procedural controls is fundamental for the 
success of the system. Transparency and anonymity differ IURPVHFXULW\DQGYHULÀDELOLW\DQG WKH OHJLVODWLYHHIIRUWV
45  Author interview.
46  Author interview.
47   Estonian National Electoral Committee (NEC), “Statistics about 
Internet Voting in Estonia,” 2015, http://www.vvk.ee/voting-
methods-in-estonia/engindex/statistics, accessed 12 May 2016.
which typically follow technological developments are 
fundamental for the adoption and implementation of the 
e-voting process. 
These challenges are evident in the Estonian I-Voting V\VWHP'XHWRWKHVPDOOVL]HRIWKHFRXQWU\RIÀFLDOVKDYH
relied since the systems inception on building trust through 
interpersonal relations. Technological advancements and 
lessons learned were converted to legislation, not always YLD IRUPDOLVHG DQG FOHDUO\ GHÀQHG SURFHGXUHV EXW DOVR
through the expertise of the electoral committee and their 
close proximity to the Estonian Parliament. Throughout its 
existence, the I-Voting system has adapted technological 
developments slowly due to the time-consuming 
legislative processes which have to be approved by 
the majority of the Estonian parliament. For instance, 
although homomorphic encryption (i.e., an encryption 
scheme where computations can be performed without 
access to original data) was technically feasible years 
ago, only recently were political circumstances in Estonia 
mature enough to legislate accordingly and allow the 
voting system to incorporate this. 
Certain controls could be enhanced with simple measures 
(e.g., instituting awareness campaigns). Some of these, 
however, are prohibited due to political controversy. 
The conundrum is evident in the two-day course, which 
is deemed highly technical and arduous for citizens, but 
which may give rise to political confrontation if changed. 
In a similar vein, awareness campaigns are prohibited due 
to the principal of equal treatment of all forms of voting  
this may expose the I-Voting system to a potentially large 
attack surface via the voter, even though the impact per 
user would be rather in favour of. Political parties claim 
that awareness campaigns for the I-voting, although they DUHIRUWKHEHQHÀWRIWKHYRWHUVPD\PRWLYDWHPRUHSHRSOH
voting through I-voting, thus the rational for this view is WKDWLQÁXHQFLQJWKHUHVXOWRIWKHHOHFWLRQV7KHDVVXPSWLRQ
behind this concern is that a certain demographic with a 
clear political preference only votes via I-voting. 
Our interviews demonstrate that Estonia has the experience 
and expertise for running successful electronic elections, 
but this success depends on the skills and expertise of key 
people who are involved in the process. While important SURFHGXUHV DUH FRGLÀHG LQ VRPH FDVHV LQFLGHQWV DQG
feedback reports appear to be addressed in a somewhat 
informal way. This may currently be effective, due to the 
professional relationships between the individuals in the 
committee.  In the event of numerous persons leaving key 
roles, however, this could raise a problem. We believe, 
therefore, that these informal processes (including 
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OHVVRQV OHDUQHG VKRXOGEH IXUWKHU FODULÀHG DQG IRUPDOO\
documented, especially for the preservation of knowledge DQGH[SHUWLVHDFURVVJHQHUDWLRQVRIHOHFWLRQRIÀFLDOV
7KH (VWRQLDQ V\VWHP ZLOO FKDQJH VLJQLÀFDQWO\ EHIRUH
the next elections in 2017. With respect to discarding 
current controls, it is of paramount importance that such a 
decision follow an established procedure, and that citizen 
feedback be taken into account. The I-Voting system has 
established a trust relationship with Estonian citizens. 
Though mathematicDOSURRIVDUHVFLHQWLÀFDOO\MXVWLÀDEOH
as more secure, they may not necessarily provide the 
same assurance to citizens, especially as the majority of 
citizens tend to show little interest in highly technical 
details of the system. With major changes on the horizon, 
it is essential that the system's procedures continue to be FULWLFDOO\UHÁHFWHGXSRQDQGLPSURYHG
